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PARTY AUTONOMY 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon * 
This is an augmented version of a paper delivered at the International Centre for Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, New Delhi, in December 1998. 
It is a privilege to be here, and the fulfilment of a long­cherished ambition.  For many 
years, and increasingly, I have admired the achievements of the Indian courts, particularly 
the Supreme Court of India.  Like most people everywhere I have aspired to see the Taj 
Mahal and other beauties and historic places of this great nation.  At last, through the 
kindness of this enlightened Centre, I have had the opportunity of experiencing something 
of these institutions and attractions at first hand.  For this I am truly grateful. 
Your Centre is virtually coeval with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 ("the 
Indian Act") of the Parliament of India.  As its Preamble suggests, the Act is largely based 
on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law in 1985.  The Act received the 
assent of the President on 16 August 1996.  Thus it can be said to have lagged marginally 
behind the corresponding modern English legislation, the Arbitration Act 1996 ("the 
English Act"), to which the Queen assented on 17 June 1996.  From another point of view, 
however, the Indian Act may be seen to be in advance of the English Act.  The latter is 
much less an adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  It preserves much more of the 
paraphernalia and complexity of the law relating to arbitration as it had evolved over the 
years in both jurisdictions, although it modernises some of this in form and was evidently 
increasingly influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Law as the work of the Parliamentary 
Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law progressed. 1 For example the English Act in 
section 69 enables appeals to the court on points of law, subject to fairly strict criteria, 
* Lord of Appeal, United Kingdom; Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Faculty of Law, Victoria 
University of Wellington. 
1 Successive chairmen of this Committee have become Law Lords, namely Lord Mustill, Lord Steyn 
and Lord Saville.  In 1989 under the chairmanship of Lord Justice Mustill, as he then was, the 
Committee recommended legislation in the nature of a codification of existing statutory and 
common law.  The ultimate Bill owed much to the work of Lord Justice Saville, as he then was, 
who is regarded as its principal architect.  It goes well beyond codification.
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whereas the Indian Act and the UNCITRAL Model Law make no such provision.  But 
under the English Act the parties may exclude appeals by agreement, so both Acts attach 
high importance to the concept that has come to dominate arbitration law towards the end 
of the twentieth century: party autonomy. 
In moving the second reading of the English Bill in the House of Lords on 18 January 
1996, the Minister of State, Department of Trade and Industry, Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, 
said. 2 
The principle of party autonomy is central to the Bill.  The parties who are in dispute are able 
to decide how the arbitration should be conducted.  The flexibility and control which this 
freedom gives to the parties is of critical importance.  Having said that, the freedom is not 
absolute.  There are a small number of provisions which for reasons of public policy cannot be 
overridden. 
Section 1 of the English Act lays down three principles in the light of which Part I is to 
be construed.  The second of these is that "the parties should be free to agree how their 
disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public 
interest".  While the Indian Act contains no corresponding express affirmation of principle, 
its tenor throughout is redolent of the same idea.  Recourse to the court, where available, is 
envisaged primarily as an aid to the arbitral process, as an auxiliary mechanism.  The court 
is a powerful ally rather than a controller or a jealous conservator of its own power.  By 
sections 34 and 48 an award may be set aside by the court, or enforcement of a foreign 
award refused, only on very limited and obviously necessary grounds, such as invalidity 
of the arbitration agreement, excess of jurisdiction as to the scope of the arbitration, and 
conflict with the public policy of India.  Error of law alone, however significant and 
however manifest on the face of the award, is not enough. 
The contemporary "politically correct" approach is thus that parties are free and should 
be encouraged to submit their disputes to arbitration (or some other alternative dispute 
resolution procedure, but this paper has to be confined mainly to arbitration) and ­ what is 
inseverable ­ that a party who loses, or becomes dissatisfied in the event, is allowed next to 
no room for repentance if there has been a fair hearing.  The autonomy is that of the parties 
acting together when they make their arbitration agreement.  It is not of course that of a 
party later disenchanted.  The new­found emphasis on party autonomy represents a far cry 
from the days when Scrutton LJ recoiled from the thought that an English arbitration could 
be conducted without the possibility of the court being entitled to exercise its statutory 
2 568 HL Deb 761.
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power to require the arbitrators to state a special case. 3 In his famous analogy of Alsatia 
the Lord Justice in effect likened an area of arbitration immune from that power as a haunt 
of thieves.  Since then the pressures of judicial workloads have led the courts to entertain 
towards arbitrators a sense of gratitude rather than rivalry, of respect rather than 
contempt.  In the Indian superior courts alone, the background of many thousands of cases 
is a powerful incentive to the new philosophy. 
So the Indian Institute, the ICADR, is vitally concerned with party autonomy, and the 
concept seems a suitable one for a little exploration in a paper for this conference.  I 
propose to discuss it with particular reference to the ability of the parties and arbitrators to 
select as the substantive law governing their arbitration a system of principles not being 
part of any specific national system of law, or no more than equity and reasonableness in a 
wide and non­technical sense.  But before doing so it is relevant to make some disclosure 
of antecedents. 
In their practical philosophy of law lawyers are what their cases have made them. 
Personal background, upbringing and experiences of life outside the law naturally shape 
one's general outlook.  In the professional work of a lawyer another major influence is 
exerted.  Whether he or she is sitting as a judge or arbitrator, or operating as a conciliator 
or mediator, or practising as an advocate or a solicitor, cases in which there has been a 
previous involvement leave a legacy to be drawn upon consciously or otherwise.  Having 
been in the law for half a century, half of it as a judge and the earlier part as a barrister and, 
rather more briefly, as an academic, I have inevitably played some part in numerous cases 
concerned in one way or another with arbitration.  In retrospect three of them stand out as 
experiences which have strongly inclined me towards sympathy for party autonomy.  I 
hope that each is sufficiently germane to the subject this morning to warrant brief mention. 
SOME FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES 
At the bar in 1969 I was engaged in a case called Wellington City v National Bank of New 
Zealand Properties Ltd. 4 It concerned an arbitration to fix a ground rent under a 
perpetually­renewable lease.  The right of renewal arose every 21 years, when a new rent 
was to be fixed by arbitration if not agreed.  This was a test case and there was a strong 
arbitral tribunal chaired by a retired senior judge of the Supreme Court (now renamed the 
High Court).  One of  the other two members was a retired judge of the Arbitration Court, 
3 Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co [1922] 2 KB 478, 487­9.  There is perhaps more to be said for the 
merits of this decision than is sometimes assumed.  The clause purporting to exclude the case 
stated procedure was contained in trade association rules; it can be seen as the product of 
monopoly power rather than free bargaining.  See further CBI NZ Ltd v Badger Chiyoda [1989] 2 
NZLR 669, 678, 685, 691, 692, 697. 
4 [1970] NZLR 660.
260 (1999) 30 VUWLR 
an industrial court which settled wages and conditions of employment.  The parties were 
agreed that the rent for the next 21 years was to be arrived at by applying an appropriate 
rate of interest to the unimproved value of the land.  The issue reduced to what was that 
rate.  The valuers called for the city (for whom I was counsel) contended for up to 8 per 
cent; the valuers called for the lessee urged 2 or 3 per cent.  Ultimately the chairman and 
the other arbitrator just mentioned awarded 4 per cent.  That was acceptable to the city, but 
not to the bank. 
An application to the court was brought by the bank for remission of the award on the 
ground that on its face, for it was fully reasoned, it was erroneous in law.  The alleged 
error of law lay in the rejection of a submission for the bank that the tenant was "entitled as 
of right to an accounting of the capital growth which the landlord enjoys", coupled with 
the acceptance of a proposition to the contrary that "it is matters that affect the lessee and 
the lessee alone that are important in arriving at what he is prepared to pay".  What lay 
behind that rejection and acceptance was that during the 21 year term the value of the land 
was likely, at least nominally, to increase.  In large measure the increase would be only 
nominal, representing inflation or the fall in the value of money.  To some extent it would 
be real, reflecting the scarcity value of prime central land in a city expanding but 
physically confined.  The argument for the lessee was that the lessor did nothing towards 
the increase in apparent value attributable to either cause, whereas the lessee at least 
looked after the land and put it to use.  I was rather proud at having persuaded one of the 
lessee's valuers to accept in cross­examination that, carried to its logical conclusion, this 
argument meant that, instead of receiving a rent, the lessor should pay the lessee for the 
latter's services as caretaker.  But I was overconfident.  The Chief Justice of the day, who 
had not been in office very long, was so bold as to hold that the retired senior judge and 
his colleague had indeed erred in law. 
Shortly after the delivery of the Chief Justice's decision, I happened to be in a queue for 
lunch, at the Law Society's cafeteria, immediately behind the retired senior judge.  It soon 
became evident that he was trying to tell me something.  He kept talking of the Court of 
Appeal and the extent of my practice there.  As it happened this hint of his hope was 
unnecessary, for I had already advised the city to appeal.  The appeal duly succeeded, the 
judges taking the view that the "as of right" proposition for the lessee was unsustainable in 
law and that the proposition in the reasons for the award about what was important for 
the lessee was not a proposition of law at all, but a commonsense observation of fact. 
The lesson which I drew from that case was that the then venerable but fully extant 
common law jurisdiction to set aside an arbitral award for error of law on its face was all 
too capable of being exploited to defeat the intentions of the parties in submitting to 
arbitration.  It was all too easy to convert into an arguable point of law some statement by 
the arbitrators that in truth amounted to no more than their appreciation of the realities of
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a situation.  The line between law and fact can be notoriously difficult to draw.  A 
generous interpretation of what amounts to error of law may be appropriate in tax cases or 
administrative law cases where the exercise of powers by public authorities against 
citizens is under review.  The same approach is much less satisfactory when used to 
subvert party autonomy in consensual arbitrations. 
The second of the three cases was in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
London in 1984.  I was sitting as a member of a board of the Judicial Committee chaired by 
Lord Diplock.  The other members were Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Roskill and Lord 
Brightman.  Not then being a peer, I was the junior member, although one of the others 
had been appointed a Privy Counsellor more recently than myself.  There are rules or 
conventions in the United Kingdom system of precedence known only to an initiated few. 
That did not prevent Lord Diplock from inviting me to write the judgment of their 
Lordships' board.  The reason for this gracious invitation was perhaps not far to seek.  In 
part the case turned on some observations which Lord Diplock himself had made the year 
before in the House of Lords in Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton. 5 From the 
interchange between bench and bar he now drew the inference that I both understood 
those observations and agreed with them.  The first limb of his inference may have been 
correct.  The second was correct up to a point. 
This case of 1984 was one of the last of the appeals to the Privy Council from Australia, 
or at least towards the end of the days of Australian appeals.  Possibly more money turned 
on it than has been at stake in any other case in which I have sat in any jurisdiction.  It is 
Queensland Electricity Generating Board v New Hope Collieries. 6 It related to a 15­year 
contract for the supply of coal to the generating board.  The contract was made in 1978 and 
envisaged three five­year periods.  For the first period there was an agreed scale of prices, 
but subject to highly elaborate escalation or price variation provisions enabling adjustment 
for increased costs falling on the colliery company.  For the succeeding periods new price 
structures were to be negotiated.  At any time the price variation provisions themselves 
were open to review in certain circumstances upon request of either party.  There was an 
arbitration clause in comprehensive but very general terms.  During the first five years the 
company requested a review going back to the very inception of the contract, and also a 
5 [1983] 1 AC 444.  Lord Diplock, at 479, had contemplated the possibility of a contract upon the 
true construction of which "the price to be paid is not to be a fair and reasonable one assessed by 
applying objective standards used by valuers in the exercise of their professional task but a price 
fixed by a named individual applying such subjective standards as he personally thinks fit". 
6 [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 205.  The case was reported belatedly in England (as distinct from Australia) I 
think after attention had been drawn to it by the late Francis Mann in his book on The Law of 
Money.  No doubt the editors of the other series of reports thought that it did not merit attention 
because of its authorship, or that it seemed to state the law too simply to be of any significance.
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review applying to the next five years.  The generating board instituted court proceedings 
in which the issue became whether the arbitration agreement extended to these requests. 
Two main issues emerged: (i) whether, as to the first five years, arbitration could increase 
prices retrospectively; and (ii) whether arbitration could establish a new price structure for 
the ensuing period. 
On the first issue the Privy Council held, reversing the courts in Queensland, that 
arbitration could not extend to varying prices before the date of a request for review.  It 
was accepted that it would have been competent for the parties, in the exercise of their 
ordinary freedom of contract, to agree specifically on a retrospective price change or an 
arbitration clause having that drastic scope.  But such an unusual degree of retrospectivity 
could only be authorised by wording of appropriate clarity; and none was to be found. 
The date of the request for review was held to mark the limit of the retrospective power. 
Although party autonomy, given a sufficiently clear intention, was thereby recognised, the 
first was the less important of the two issues. 
The second, and more important, issue resulted from a contention for the generating 
board that the agreement was void for uncertainty as to the periods after the first five years 
­ a mere agreement to agree.  Here the Privy Council upheld the conclusion reached in the 
courts below, albeit on reasoning perhaps not quite the same.  Citing Sudbrook and a range 
of cases from elsewhere in the Commonwealth, the Privy Council said that at the present 
day, in cases where the parties have agreed on an arbitration or valuation clause in wide 
enough terms, the courts attach full weight to their manifest intention to create continuing 
legal relations.  Arguments involving alleged uncertainty, or alleged inadequacy of the 
machinery available to the courts for making contractual rights effective, exert minimal 
attraction. 
The Privy Council reasoning went on that here, by their agreement, the parties 
undertook implied primary obligations to make reasonable endeavours to agree on the 
terms of supply and, failing agreement, to do everything reasonably necessary to procure 
the appointment of an arbitrator.  Further, it is implicit in a commercial agreement of this 
kind that the terms of the new price structure are to be fair and reasonable between the 
parties.  That is the criterion by which the arbitrator is to be guided.  If there are cases 
where the true meaning of the contract is that the arbitrator is to aim, not at objectively fair 
and reasonable terms, but merely at some result which appeals to him subjectively, they 
must be rare indeed and the present was certainly not one of them.  (The last sentence was 
something of a qualification of what had been said in Sudbrook.)  How the system had 
worked during the first five years would be likely to provide the arbitrator with much help 
in determining what was fair and reasonable for the next period.
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Since that case I have remained of the persuasion that, apart from public policy 
limitations, there is very little that cannot be achieved by arbitration.  It is a remedy of 
almost supreme versatility.  A fortiori, conciliation and mediation must share this capacity. 
During my presidency of the New Zealand Court of Appeal we had a case which is the 
very epitome of international commercial arbitration, CBI NZ Ltd v Badger Chiyoda 7 in 1988. 
It related to extensions to an oil refinery in New Zealand.  Badger was a joint venture 
between a Netherlands and a Japanese company and was the head contractor.  CBI, 
Chicago­controlled, was a subcontractor for the supply and erection of tanks.  The 
subcontract, negotiated at The Hague, provided for arbitration under ICC (International 
Chamber of Commerce) rules.  Disputes arose between the parties, mainly reflecting 
labour troubles and increased costs incurred by CBI, and they were duly referred to the 
arbitration of a retired New Zealand High Court Judge.  The arbitration took place in New 
Zealand but, as customary under the rules, was "supervised" by an ICC counsel in Paris. 
Nevertheless the proper law of the contract was New Zealand law, by express agreement. 
The parties requested the arbitrator to deliver a partial or interim award ruling on the 
interpretation of certain clauses in the subcontract and on whether post­contract dealings 
were admissible as an aid to interpretation.  He did deliver such an award.  CBI, invoking 
the inherent common law jurisdiction, applied to the court for the setting aside or 
remission of the award on the ground of alleged error of law on its face.  Badger contended 
that the jurisdiction was excluded by a clause in the ICC rules providing inter alia that the 
parties were to be deemed to have waived their right to any form of appeal insofar as such 
waiver could validly be made. 
There was no difficulty in concluding that, though nominally a form of review, the 
jurisdiction to set aside an award for error of law on the face gives in substance a right of 
appeal and so was prima facie excluded by the waiver clause.  The real issue was whether, 
as contended by CBI in reliance on Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co 8 and the traditional 
attitude of English courts to ouster clauses, the waiver was void as contrary to public 
policy.  Did modern New Zealand public policy require a decision to that effect?  A court 
of five judges unanimously answered the question in the negative. 
The view taken was that, while prior decisions based on public policy are not lightly to 
be abandoned, they are not sacrosanct.  Public policy is not static.  Changes in society or in 
attitudes prevailing internationally may show that apprehensions once seen as real and 
weighty are obviously no longer so.  It was well known that for a decade and more there 
had been a strong trend in common law countries towards giving greater rein to party 
7 Above n 3. 
8 Above n 3.
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autonomy, partly in emulation of other systems of law and especially in international 
commercial arbitrations.  Contributing causes had been the perceived preferences of 
businessmen, the clogging of court lists, and in England a phase of heavy resort to the case 
stated procedure. 
It was noted that Czarnikow itself, being concerned with the statutory case stated 
jurisdiction, did not deal with the old common law review jurisdiction regarding error of 
law.  To apply the Czarnikow approach so as to hold that public policy ruled out attempts 
to exclude the jurisdiction would give rise to some logical difficulty.  For at common law it 
was undoubtedly open to the parties to exclude that jurisdiction perfectly legitimately, by 
stipulating that reasons should not be given for the award, or if given should not be 
treated as part of the award, or by referring a specific question of law to the arbitrator 
(even a layman). 
Far from undermining public policy, the parties to a commercial dispute could be seen 
to be furthering the public interest by selecting and meeting the cost of their own dispute­ 
resolution machinery, rather than resorting to facilities provided and subsidised by the 
state.  Certainly the arbitration might well not provide a publicly­accessible contribution to 
jurisprudence; but there was no reason why parties freely contracting should be obliged by 
public policy to make a compulsory contribution to the worthy cause of the coherent 
evolution of  commercial law. 
The point about freedom of contract was important.  In the instant case the parties who 
had accepted the waiver clause as part of their contract for arbitration were two very large 
international concerns.  There was no suggestion of inequality of bargaining power.  The 
possibility was left open  by the Court of Appeal that where there is manifest inequality of 
bargaining power or exploitation of a monopoly trade position or the like, so that one 
party is virtually forced to submit to an ouster clause, there might still be room for the 
Czarnikow approach.  In other words, public policy may require reasonable fairness to 
individuals. It seems doubtful, however, in India whether the Indian Act is consistent with 
such an escape route. 
The philosophy reinforced for me by the CBI NZ Ltd case is summed up by the 
proposition that modern public policy points strongly towards non­interference with 
arbitral decisions if the parties clearly intended them to be final.  In all such cases non­ 
interference should be the prima facie rule, with the onus falling on the party who seeks to 
displace it to show cogent reasons for doing so.  That at least seems wholly in accord with 
the spirit of the Indian Act. 
ALLEGED EXCEPTIONS 
In India the main bastions of party autonomy are to be found in sections 7 and 28 of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.  For international commercial arbitrations they
PARTY AUTONOMY 265 
virtually reproduce provisions of the UNCITRAL model law.  The first subsection of 
section 7 provides: 
(1) In this part "arbitration agreement" means an agreement by the parties to submit to 
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in 
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. 
Section 28 reads: 
Rules applicable to substance of dispute: 
(1) Where the place of arbitration is situate in India­ 
(a) In an arbitration other than an international commercial arbitration, the arbitral 
tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to arbitration in accordance with the 
substantive law for the time being in force in India; 
(b) in international commercial arbitration­ 
(i) the arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the rules of 
law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute; 
(ii) any designation by the parties of the law or legal system of a given country 
shall be construed, unless otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the 
substantive law of that country and not to its conflict of laws rules; 
(iii) failing any designation of the law under sub­clause (ii) by the parties, the 
arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law it considers to be appropriate 
given all the circumstances surrounding the dispute. 
(2) The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the 
parties have expressly authorized it to do so. 
(3) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract 
and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction. 
It will be seen that what may conveniently be called ordinary domestic arbitrations are 
to be decided in accordance with the substantive law of India.  There is a refinement 
regarding the state of Jammu and Kashmir which has its own similar legislation ­ see the 
proviso to section 1(2) ­ but that may be disregarded for present purposes.  As to 
international commercial arbitrations taking place in India, however, the parties are given 
much more flexibility.  Such arbitrations outside India are likely commonly to have as their 
proper law the law of the place of arbitration, this representing a change from the position
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previously established by Supreme Court decisions, 9 but again the present paper is not 
concerned directly with that category of cases.  Its direct concern is the important category 
of international arbitrations where the place of arbitration chosen by the parties, in 
pursuance of their freedom of choice under section 28(1), is India; or where, failing such an 
agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribunal designates India in exercise of the power 
conferred by section 28(2).  "International commercial arbitration" is defined by section 2(f) 
in terms which are quite elaborate and need not be reproduced.  Broadly, they stipulate 
that at least one of the parties is based outside India. 
A question which therefore calls for examination is whether in international 
commercial arbitrations taking place in India the Act denies the parties freedom of choice 
of the governing principles to an extent constituting a significant inroad into the concept of 
party autonomy.  The relevance of the question arises from the emergence during the 
second half of the twentieth century, particularly from the nineteen­sixties onwards, of "the 
new lex mercatoria" and such compilations as the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts 10 and Principles of European Contract Law, Part I. 11 Can principles 
derived from such sources form the basis of international commercial arbitrations held in 
India under the Act of 1996?  If any doubt is still entertained in India on this point by 
ICADR or members of the legal or other professions, I hope that it may soon be put to rest. 
It would savour of an age now past. 
The passing of the age may be identified in England with Home Insurance Co Ltd v 
Mentor Insurance Co (UK) Ltd in 1988. 12 In that case Hirst J in the High Court had granted a 
stay of certain court proceedings in the light of an arbitration clause providing: 
The Arbitrators and the Umpire shall interpret this Reinsurance as an honourable engagement 
and they shall make their award with a view to effecting the general purpose of this 
Reinsurance in a reasonable manner rather than in accordance with a literal interpretation of 
the language. 
The Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the stay, but, contrasting positions were 
taken in the two reasoned judgments then delivered. 13 Parker LJ said: 14 
9 NTPC v Singer Company [1992] 3 SCC 551; Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd v DNGC Ltd [1998] 1 SCC 
305. 
10 Rome, 1994. 
11 First Commission on European Contract Law, 1995. 
12 [1989] 3 All ER 74. 
13 Home Insurance above n 12, 85.  The third member of the court, Balcombe LJ, said that he agreed 
with both judgments.
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I have no hesitation in accepting the submission of counsel for Home that a clause which 
purported to free arbitrators to decide without regard to the law and accordingly, for example, 
to their own notions of what would be fair would not be a valid arbitration clause. 
He doubted, however, whether the clause did any more than authorise the arbitrators 
to apply an approach to interpretation founded on business efficacy rather than a literal or 
ordinary one.  That was, with respect, the voice of the past.  Lloyd LJ in this matter may be 
thought to have spoken for the future when he said, after citing DST v Raknoc (to which I 
will refer in a moment) and other authorities: 15 
Counsel for Home argued that DST v Raknoc was concerned only with the enforcement of a 
foreign award, and that it has no bearing on the present case, where the contract calls for 
arbitration in London.  But why not?  If the English courts will enforce a foreign award where 
the contract is governed by a "system of "law" which is not that of England or any other state 
or is a serious modification of such a law" (see [1987] 2 All ER 769 at 778, [1987] 3 WLR 1023 at 
1034), why should it not enforce an English award in like circumstances?  And if it will enforce 
an English award, why should it not grant a stay? 
Counsel for Home argued that it would be impossible for the court to supervise an arbitration 
unless it is conducted in accordance with a fixed and recognisable system of law; he even went 
so far as to submit that the arbitration clause in the present case is not an arbitration agreement 
within the meaning of the Arbitration Acts 1950 to 1979.  It is sufficient to say that I disagree.  I 
would only add (although it cannot affect the argument) that if counsel for Home is right, no 
ICC arbitration could be held with confidence in this country for fear that the arbitrators might 
adopt the same governing law as they did in DST v Raknoc. 
DST v Raknoc, 16 otherwise known as the Ras al Kaimal or Rakoil case, related to an 
award by arbitrators in Geneva arising from an oil and gas exploration contract which the 
government of a Gulf state and its oil company had repudiated for alleged 
misrepresentation.  The award was in favour of the other party, a foreign consortium.  The 
arbitrators held that the proper law of the contract was simply internationally accepted 
principles of contract law.  Enforcement being resisted on the ground that English law 
would not recognise an award based on such principles, Sir John Donaldson MR said that 
by choosing to arbitrate under ICC rules the parties had left the proper law to be decided 
by the arbitrators and had not in terms confined the choice to national systems of law.  He 
could see no basis for concluding that the arbitrators' choice of proper law ­ a common 
14 Home Insurance above n 12, 80. 
15 Home Insurance above n 12, 84­85. 
16 [1990] 1 AC 295, 316.  The case went to the House of Lords on another point not requiring 
consideration of the opinion of the Master of the Rolls for which I am citing it.
268 (1999) 30 VUWLR 
denominator of principles underlying the law of the various nations governing contractual 
relations ­ was outwith the scope of the choice which the parties left to the arbitrators. 
Since the Home Insurance case the most significant relevant judicial decision in England 
has probably been Channel Tunnel Group v Balfour Beatty Ltd. 17 The House of Lords upheld 
a stay of court proceedings where the contract providing for reference to experts and 
subsequent arbitration was expressed to be governed by those principles of English and 
French contract law which are common and, in the absence of any such common 
principles, by such general principles of international trade law as have been applied by 
national and international tribunals.  Throughout the history of the case no one appears to 
have sought to ventilate any issue as to the efficacy of this choice­of­law clause.  It is of 
much interest, for reasons which I am about to mention, that the leading speech in the 
House of Lords was delivered by Lord Mustill. 
The lex mercatoria of our age has emerged largely from arbitration clauses in or 
incorporated in international commercial contracts, expressed in terms sufficiently wide to 
require or allow arbitrators, in determining a dispute on the merits, to apply criteria 
transcending the law of any particular country. 18 Typically they concern an actual or 
apprehended dispute between a contractor, concessionaire or lender based in a developed 
capitalist society, on the one hand, and developing states or their agencies, on the other, 
arising out of natural resources exploitation or development loans.  The concept of the lex 
mercatoria thus owes much to fear of alteration of local laws, by nationalisation or less 
extreme steps, to the disadvantage of the overseas party.  International development banks 
quite commonly have lex mercatoria conditions or the like as part of their standard terms of 
lending.  But, as the Channel Tunnel Group case demonstrates, in international commercial 
dealings between parties of comparable standing and bargaining power the concept also 
has a natural attraction. 
With the ever­increasing internationalisation of commerce it seems almost inevitable 
that the lex mercatoria will increasingly flourish.  Yet it has had, and no doubt still has, 
powerful critics.  The late Francis Mann was one.  The most influential living critic is 
probably Lord Mustill, now retired as a Law Lord and returned to a leading role in the fold 
of professional arbitrators.  In his contribution to Liber Amicorum for Lord Wilberforce in 
17 [1993] AC 334. 
18 Some of the present paper is an adaptation of part of my (unpublished) lecture, entitled The 
Common Law of the World, for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, given in 
the India Office Council Chamber at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, on 2 
December 1997.  It has been revised, however, and is presented mainly from the point of one 
speaking in New Delhi rather than King Charles Street.  For New Zealand readers an addendum 
at the end speaks as from a window overlooking Lambton Quay.
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1987, entitled The New Lex Mercatoria, The First Twenty­Five Years, Sir Michael Mustill, as he 
then was, made it clear that his friendship did not extend to the doctrine on which he 
wrote.  It is a sustained, skilfully­argued analytical assault on the lex, based on grounds 
such as vagueness and absence of identifiable ancestry.  He gave a list of twenty 
propositions as representing "a tolerable complete account of the rules which are said to 
constitute the lex mercatoria in its present form".  These he described as "a comparatively 
modest haul for twenty­five years of international arbitration".  When his paper was 
republished a year later, 19 he found it necessary to point out specifically that he was not 
suggesting that the twenty claims could be sustained in all cases, "at least if the lex is given 
its "macro" connotation". 20 Evidently some supporters of the lex mercatoria, far from seeing 
the haul as modest, had held up the list compiled by such an eminent author as compelling 
evidence of its triumph.  As might be expected, the leading English textbook Mustill and 
Boyd in The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration 21 treats the subject on lines similar to 
those of the paper. 
A more florid treatment of the subject, albeit reflecting a similar point of view, is by a 
writer in the Tulane Law Review in 1989: 22 
The lex mercatoria obviously does exist, to the extent that scholars and practitioners talk about 
it and identify it.  It is, however, a scholarly fantasy to assert that something exists just because 
one can talk about it in the course of questioning its existence.  It may, like the Emperor's 
clothes, be non­existent, and yet one can still argue about it at great length.  To dispute the 
existence of something cannot itself have any effect on the outcome of that inquiry.  Otherwise, 
all one would have to do to verify the existence of a principle would be to deny it.  It is more 
useful to discuss the extent to which the lex mercatoria possesses validity or vitality, and the 
extent to which it is what it pretends to be or ­ more accurately ­ what some would have it be. 
The lex mercatoria is in fact an enigma, created by a paradox that placed many investors in a 
dilemma.  The paradox has in turn created a quandary from which the only way out was to 
arrive at the enigma by way of a fallacy. 
A less condemnatory, if not exactly enthusiastic, position is taken by Professor Roy 
Goode 23 in an article published in 1997. 24 With a scholar's vocational predilection for 
19 (1988) 4 Arbitration International. 
20 Above n 19, 110, n 81a. 
21 (2 ed, Butterworths, London, 1989) 74­86. 
22 Keith Highet "The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria" (1989) 63 Tulane L Rev 613, 616. 
23 Aptly described on the dust cover of Ross Cranston (ed) Making Commercial Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1997) as "one of the century's outstanding commercial law scholars". 
24 "Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law" (1997) 46 ICLQ 1, 35­6.
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expoundable rules, it is not surprising that he sees the diversity of approaches in 
arbitration as tending to undermine the unifying effects of an international law merchant; 
and he does not consider it the function of arbitral awards to develop international 
jurisprudence.  All that matters at the end of the day, he says, is that the arbitral tribunal 
reaches a result that commends itself to the reasonable man as just in the particular case.  I 
dare to interpolate that this is a great deal of what matters in the decisions of any court 
under any system of law; systems of law are successful to the extent that they result in the 
just decisions of particular cases.  Professor Goode's cautious conclusion is "so perhaps the 
growing recourse to international trade usage, to the exclusion of national law, is not a bad 
thing after all". 
Despite its critics, and despite the instinctive reaction of many lawyers when having 
occasion to wrestle with the idea for the first time, support for the lex mercatoria and even 
wider general principles appears to be growing steadily among writers and those 
professionally involved in arbitrations.  To compile a bibliography of the literature in this 
field is not a task for which I am volunteering.  It will have to be enough to mention a few 
contributions that I respectfully recommend as positive and helpful, and to give some hint 
of their flavour. 
My list begins with a paper by Stewart Boyd QC published in 1990 on "Arbitrators not to 
be bound by the Law" Clauses. 25 The second joint author of Mustill and Boyd appears to take a 
view rather different from the first, for he sees " no possible injury to the administration of 
justice in England or to the purity and clarity of English commercial law which would flow 
from giving such clauses [viz, equity and good conscience clauses, which he treats as 
embracing or falling under the same head as the lex mercatoria] their full meaning and 
effect".  In the same journal there follows Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator's View 26 by 
Professor Andreas F Lowenfeld of the New York University School of Law.  He concludes, 
speaking from much practical experience, that most arbitrators do not look first of all for 
compromise.  "International arbitrators do seek to achieve just results within a legal 
framework, and that framework is by definition wider than the frontiers of any state.  To 
me, this is the vision, the promise, and the usefulness of lex mercatoria". 
An important contribution from a member of the New York bar is David W Rivkin's 
Enforceability of Arbitral Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria in 1993. 27 This article gives many 
actual examples of arbitrations conducted on that or a like basis in a variety of 
jurisdictions.  He cites authority leading him to perceive a likelihood that United States 
25 "Arbitrators not to be bound by the Law Clauses" (1990) 6 Arbitration International 122, 130. 
26 (1990) 6 Arbitration International 133. 
27 "Enforceability of Arbitral Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria" (1993) 9 Arbitration International 67.
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courts will respect the parties' choice of a non­national standard to govern the merits of 
their dispute. 
There is a valuable synthesis by Jérôme Huet in The Unidroit Principles for International 
Commercial Contracts: A New Lex Mercatoria published in 1995. 28 In the following year an 
informative article about international development loans was published in the United 
States. 29 And the 1997 compilation in honour of Roy Goode which I have noted 
previously 30 contains a number of instructive pieces, among which I specify, if invidiously, 
Professor Ole Lando's Eight Principles of European Contract Law, 31 since it comes from one of 
the most noted proponents of the lex, and Professor M J Bonell's piece with a long title 32 
but being essentially a comparison of contract law principles.  The last­mentioned paper 
includes a striking example of a recent arbitration between an English company and an 
Iranian government agency in which the governing substantive law had been agreed to be 
simply "principles of natural justice". 33 The arbitral tribunal decided, I understand by a 
majority of two to one (an eminent English Queen's Counsel dissenting), that these 
principles are wide enough to import a duty to bring and prosecute a claim without 
unreasonable delay, although there was found in that case to be no breach of the duty. 
The onward march of the concept of principles transcending national boundaries is 
marked further by section 46 of the Arbitration Act 1996 extending to England and Wales 
and (with exceptions) Northern Ireland.  Again these provisions are UNCITRAL inspired: 
46. Rules applicable to substance of dispute 
(1) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute— 
(a) in accordance with the law chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of 
the dispute, or 
(b) if the parties so agree, in accordance with such other considerations as are agreed 
by them or determined by the tribunal. 
(2) For this purpose the choice of the laws of a county shall be understood to refer to the 
substantive laws of that country and not its conflict of laws rules. 
28 Institute of International Law and Practice, 279. 
29 John Head "Evolution of the Governing Law for Loan Agreements of the World Bank and other 
Multi­lateral Development Banks" (1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 214. 
30 Above n 23. 
31 Above n 23, 103. 
32 Above n 23, 91. 
33 Above n 23, 100.
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(3) If or to the extent that there is no such choice or agreement, the tribunal shall apply the 
law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable. 
Of this Lord Justice Saville's Committee said in their report of February 1996: 34 
223.  Sub­section (1) (b) recognizes that the parties may agree that their dispute is not to be 
decided in accordance with a recognized system of law but under what in this country are 
often called "equity clauses", or arbitration "ex aequo et bono", or "amiable composition" ie general 
considerations of justice and fairness etc..  It will be noted that we have avoided using this 
description in the Bill, just as we have avoided using the Latin and French expressions found 
in the Model Law.  There appears to be no good reason to prevent parties from agreeing to 
equity clauses.  However, it is to be noted that in agreeing that a dispute shall be resolved in 
this way, the parties are in effect excluding any right to appeal to the Court (there being no 
"question of law" to appeal). 
If "law" be regarded as including generally­recognised principles, subsection (1)(b) also 
covers the ground to which the committee refer.  As to exclusion of any right of appeal to 
the court, so far as the section achieves this it accords with the principle of party 
autonomy. 
THE MEANING OF SECTION 28 OF THE INDIAN ACT 
While the true meaning of section 28 is of course governed by its own wording read in 
the context the Act of 1996 as a whole, the international developments just sketched are an 
aid to interpretation.  They help us to see the section in perspective and with an awareness 
of the issues with which the section was designed to deal. 
For our purposes the first point to be noted about the section is that subsection (2) 
disposes of the once prevailing but now outdated approach illustrated by the judgment of 
Parker LJ in the Home Insurance case.  In this subsection it is implicit that an international 
commercial arbitration, to take place in India, may be validly constituted under the Indian 
Act notwithstanding that the parties have left the arbitrators an extremely wide freedom to 
depart from the rules of any legal system.  If the parties have done so, the award will be 
final under section 35, subject to the quite stringently restricted grounds for setting aside 
specified in section 34. 
The subsection is capable, however, of giving rise to some difficulties of interpretation. 
To bring their agreement within it, the parties must expressly authorise the arbitral tribunal 
to decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur.  How express is express? Presumably it 
is unnecessary to use the precise Latin or French phrases.  Equivalent terminology in 
English or any other language should do.  According to the glossary in Russell on 
34 Above n 1.
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Arbitration, 35 the two phrases would appear to mean the same thing.  That standard work 
defines Amiable Compositeurs as "arbitrators who resolve disputes without recourse to strict 
application of any particular law".  But the qualification "strict", suggestive as it is of only a 
limited flexibility, rather muddies that definition.  Moreover, to many people the French 
words are more suggestive of conciliation or mediation than of arbitration. 
Whatever the position under section 28(2), I am disposed to think that section 28(1)(b) 
provides all the party autonomy that is needed.  There are some fine, but potentially 
important, differences in the terms of its three  paragraphs.  Paragraph (i) has "the rules of 
law";  paragraph (ii) has "the law or legal system of a given country"; paragraph (iii) 
returns to "the rules of law".  It seems a fairly plain inference that, whereas paragraph (ii) 
applies only where the parties have designated a given national system, and is intended to 
make it clear that this refers to the substantive law of that system rather than its conflict of 
laws rules, paragraphs (i) and (iii) are not restricted to particular national systems.  That is 
to say, those paragraphs leave the parties or the arbitrators, as the case may be, free to 
select any governing principles which can fairly be described as rules of law. UNIDROIT 
principles, for instance, are not the law of any given country; but they have been 
deliberately promulgated as rules of law which are intended to be available internationally 
for choice in the exercise of party autonomy. 
The foregoing approach can be taken further.  It can be applied to more generally­ 
expressed choices, such as principles common to legal systems, or the rules of natural 
justice, or even simply fair and reasonable.  Here I venture to go back to the Queensland 
Electricity case 36 and the qualification there added by the Privy Council to Lord Diplock's 
exposition in the Sudbrook case. 37 It is fallacious to equate mere personal predilection, 
whim or caprice with a decision as to what is fair and reasonable.  Parties who agree on the 
latter standard formula do not intend their tribunal to decide arbitrarily or irrationally. 
They have in mind, rather, the everyday objective standard of the reasonable man.  It is a 
standard constantly applied in other main fields of law. 
The reasonable man is forever appearing in the law of negligence, tort, contract, trust, 
crime, and so on.  Certainly it is a standard that often allows for choice.  Indeed the need 
for principles of some flexibility capable of achieving justice in a great range of particular 
cases is its very raison d'etre.  But, wherever the standard applies, the postulate is always 
that it is an objective one, entailing a search for what a hypothetical person of common 
35 Russell on Arbitration (21 ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1997) 456. 
36 Above n 6. 
37 Above n 5.
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sense (or a reasonable skilled person holding himself or herself out as having vocational 
skill) would do in the circumstances of the case. 
The argument commonly applied against resort to the simple standard of 
reasonableness is uncertainty.  It is exactly the same principal argument as is advanced by 
the critics of the lex mercatoria.  But it is not allowed to prevail in other branches of the law. 
Furthermore, it tends to exaggerate the extent to which a system of ostensibly more black­ 
and­white rules truly does produce certainty.  The law reports are full of cases where these 
rules fall short or are unclear or clash or merge into grey areas.  Even as reputedly 
sophisticated and certain a subject as the English common law of contract is a minefield of 
uncertainties. 38 
For these reasons I submit that the Indian Act of 1996 gives parties to international 
commercial arbitrations full ability, in the exercise of their autonomy, to have their 
disputes arbitrated in accordance with broad common principles of justice crossing 
national boundaries.  So far as is consistent with any agreement of the parties, arbitrators 
should enjoy the like power.  It is true that arbitrations based on such principles do not 
contribute much detailed law to the textbooks.  Nevertheless the materials cited earlier in 
this paper indicate that, with the help of codifications offered by teams of scholars, viable 
general principles are being gradually but fruitfully evolved in the commercial field.  It is 
all part of the evolution of a common law of the world, which in the very  long term can be 
seen as an achievable goal of mankind. 
INDIAN CASE LAW BEFORE THE ACT OF 1996 
Upon request the ICADR has kindly supplied me with some references to decisions 
under the former law of India.  These are outside the scope of the present paper and chiefly 
of historical interest, although the old law continues to apply to awards made under the 
former legislation.  Under the Indian Arbitration Act 1940 the Supreme Court accepted 
that, provided that an error of law appeared on the face of an award and that the case was 
not one of the reference to an arbitrator of a specific question of law, the arbitrator was not 
a conciliator and could not ignore the law in order to do what he thought just and 
reasonable.  So the court could set aside the award: Thawardas v Union of India; 39 Continental 
Construction Co Ltd v State of  Madhga Pradesh. 40 It is to be noted that these were evidently 
domestic arbitrations, not international commercial arbitrations, and that the arbitration 
agreements contained no equity clauses.  Where the Act of 1996 applies, arbitral decisions 
38 See a review of Consensus ad Idem, Essays in the Law of Contract in Honour of Geunter Treitel, edited 
by Francis Rose (1998) 114 LQR 505. 
39 (1955) 2 SCR 48. 
40 (1988) 3 SCC 82.
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in cases within this category will apparently be invulnerable, notwithstanding alleged 
error of law on the face of the award, unless some ground of a jurisdictional nature can be 
established ­ which could be difficult. 
By contrast there is a judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Sitanna 
v Viranna, 41 relating to a family inheritance dispute, where after a very belated challenge 
(no less than 41 years had elapsed) an award of a panchayat was left standing on the 
following broad grounds, as stated by Sir John Wallis: 42 
Reference to a village panchayat is the time­honoured method of deciding disputes of this 
kind, and has these advantages, that it is generally comparatively easy for the panchayatdars 
to ascertain the true facts, and that, as in this case, it avoids protracted litigation which, as 
observed by one of the witnesses, might have proved ruinous to the estate.  Looking at the 
evidence as a whole their Lordships see no reason for doubting that the award was a fair and 
honest settlement of a doubtful claim based both on legal and moral grounds, and are 
therefore of opinion that there are no grounds for interfering with it. 
Thus, 60 years and more before the Act of 1996, the Privy Council anticipated a good 
deal of its spirit. 
THE NEW ZEALAND ACT OF 1996 
In New Zealand the Arbitration Act 1996 43 largely following recommendations of the 
Law Commission, was enacted on 2 September 1996, in the same year as the English and 
Indian Acts and in the same mould inasmuch as it is strongly influenced by UNCITRAL 
and is permeated by the principle of party autonomy.  But the New Zealand Act is very 
different in structure and considerably different in substance.  The main body of the Act is 
in appearance fairly simple, consisting of a mere twenty sections.  Then, annexed in five 
Schedules, are Rules Applying to Arbitration Generally: Additional Optional Rules 
Applying to Arbitration: Treaties Relating to Arbitration: Enactments Amended: and 
Enactments Repealed.  The advantage of this structure is a certain tidiness and elegance, 
the disadvantage that arriving at a conclusion as to the effect of the Act in any given case 
can be like orienteering. 
41 1934 AIR PC 105 
42 Above n 41, 107. 
43 For a fuller account of the Act, see Arbitration and Dispute Resolution by D A R Williams Q C in 
[1998] NZ Law Rev 1.  The New Zealand Law Society's seminar paper (May 1997) on the Act by 
Fred Thorp and David Williams Q C is also useful.  The Law Commission Report is Arbitration 
(Report 20 NZLC, 1991).
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The most distinctive feature of substance in the New Zealand Act is that, for 
arbitrations in New Zealand, section 6 lays down an original approach to the difference 
between international arbitrations (as defined) and all others.  The Act does not speak of 
domestic arbitrations, but that term may be used for convenience.  In domestic arbitrations 
some most important rules apply unless the parties agree otherwise.  By Article 5 of the 
Second Schedule, these include a right of appeal to the High Court, with the leave of that 
court, on any question of law arising out of an award; with a further appeal to the Court of 
Appeal by leave.  In sharp contrast, such appeals are only available in international 
arbitrations if the parties so agree.  In all arbitrations, however, the High Court 
(presumably subject to appeal) has power under article 34 of the First Schedule to set aside 
an award on such grounds as invalidity of the arbitration agreement, excess of the scope of 
the submission, fraud or breach of natural justice. 
There are in section 11 of the New Zealand Act special provisions regarding consumer 
agreements (quite widely defined) aimed at ensuring that consumers do not accept 
arbitration unless they have unequivocally agreed to it in writing. 44 
As for the rules applicable to the substance of the dispute, the First Schedule of the 
New Zealand Act provides: 
28 Rules applicable to substance of dispute 
(1) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as 
are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute.  Any designation 
of the law or legal system of a given state shall be construed, unless otherwise expressed, 
as directly referring to the substantive law of that State and not to its conflict of laws 
rules. 
(2) Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law 
determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable. 
(3) The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur (according 
to considerations of general justice and fairness) only if the parties have expressly 
authorised it to do so. 
44 It may be as well to note here that the English Act of 1996, s 87, provides that a clause in a 
domestic agreement excluding appeals to the court on questions of law is not effective unless 
entered into after the commencement of the arbitral proceedings.  This section has not been 
brought into force, however, as it was thought to be contrary to the Treaty of Rome in putting 
United Kingdom consumers at an advantage over consumers elsewhere in the European 
Community.  Sections 89 to 91 of the English Act make applicable to consumer arbitration 
agreements certain regulations relating to unfair terms.  These complications are among the quite 
numerous differences between current New Zealand and current English arbitration law.
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(4) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of any 
contract and shall take into account any usages of the trade applicable to the transaction. 
This is almost identical with article 28 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, although the 
New Zealand version adventurously and generously explains ex aequo et bono or as amiable 
compositeur as meaning "according to considerations of general justice and fairness". 
Notice that the New Zealand article 28 applies to all arbitrations.  Unlike India, New 
Zealand does not insist on domestic arbitrations being determined in accordance with 
domestic law.  In this respect New Zealand is more thoroughgoing in accepting party 
autonomy.  To the extent that the parties are free to select the rules of law applicable to the 
substance of their dispute, the Indian and New Zealand statutory provisions are the same, 
except for the New Zealand explanatory definition just mentioned.  So my suggestion that 
the parties need not designate any specific national system but may, for instance, select the 
lex mercatoria can also be made regarding the New Zealand Act.  The lex mercatoria is, after 
all, comprised of rules, even though their content is still evolving and they are somewhat 
general.  Nonetheless, it may be safely predicted that for some time to come the lex 
mercatoria, the UNIDROIT principles and the like will rarely be applied as such in New 
Zealand unless the parties have expressly authorised the arbitral tribunal to decide on that 
basis, pursuant to their liberty under article 28(1) or article 28(3). 
A strict constructionist, if there are any left, could wreak mischief by reading article 
28(3) as prohibiting the arbitral tribunal from deciding according to considerations of 
general justice and fairness in all cases where the parties have not given express authority, 
even if those considerations happened to produce the same result as that of an applicable 
state system.  I hazard the guess that this risk need not be taken seriously, although the 
possibility cannot be excluded that some desperate counsel might not be above trying 
some version of the idea. 
What is to be taken seriously is that the New Zealand legislation goes a very long way, 
further than England, further than India, in the direction of party autonomy.  It will be 
illuminating to see how often, in domestic arbitrations, the parties exercise their power to 
contract out of appeals to the court by leave on questions of law.  This is partly an issue of 
confidence in the judicial system on the one hand and the qualities of arbitrators on the 
other.  On it I am not prepared to hazard any guess.
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